

















From Competition to Regulation: 













Paper to be presented at the International Telecommunications Society European Region 





New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc. and  
Victoria Management School, Victoria University of Wellington,  
PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand.    Email bronwyn.howell@vuw.ac.nz
 
Acknowledgement: The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Glenn Boyle, 
Roderick Deane, Lewis Evans, Heikki Hämmäinen and Bryce Wilkinson, and academic 
support from colleagues at the New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and 
Regulation, Victoria Management School, Victoria University of Wellington and the 
Networking Laboratory of the Helsinki University of Technology, during the preparation of 
this paper.  Financial support was provided by the Deane Endowment Trust.  The views in 
this paper solely reflect those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the 
institutions with which she is affiliated or their constituent members. Any errors or omissions 
remain the responsibility of the author.   
Abstract 
Using an efficiency-based framework, this paper analyses the performance of New Zealand’s 
telecommunications sector under competition law-based sector governance (the period from 
1987 to 2001) and under industry-specific regulation (2001 to 2007).  The framework 
considers the productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency effects of each regime, and the 
nature of the strategic interaction of sector participants.  
 
The analysis reveals that substantial gains in all forms of efficiency were achieved during the 
1990s, both compared to historic New Zealand and contemporary OECD benchmarks.  Under 
industry-specific regulation, however, transfers to consumers appear to have reduced, 
transaction costs have increased and delays are being incurred in the deployment of new 
applications and technologies relative to the competition law regime as participants engage in 
strategic gaming with politicians and the regulator and respond predictably to the range of 
incentives offered under the regulatory regime.  The paper concludes that on balance in the 
New Zealand circumstances, the regime based predominantly upon competition law appears 
to have outperformed the industry-specific regulatory regime, albeit due in large part to sector 
participant interaction shaped by contractual obligations imposed by the government on the 




New Zealand was the first country in the OECD to adopt a ‘light-handed’ approach to 
telecommunications regulation when, in 1987, it eschewed industry-specific regulation, 
“relying instead on the potential for entry to discipline behaviour within the context of a 
business environment for which the competitive practices of all firms are subject to a single 
Commerce Act” (Boles de Boer & Evans, 1996:24). The Telecommunications Act 1987 
marked the end of combined state sector ownership and political control of the 
telecommunications sector that had characterised the New Zealand industry’s first hundred 
years (Wilson, 1994).  The reforms resulted in the removal of all regulatory restrictions on the 
supply of telecommunications equipment from mid 1988, the creation of a stand-alone 
telecommunications State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) on 1 April 1989, and the simultaneous 
removal of all statutory monopoly provisions protecting the state-owned enterprise from 
competition in any of its service provision 0activities (Howell, 2007).    
 
The ‘light-handed’ regulatory environment established under the Commerce Act 1986 and the 
Telecommunications Act 1987 prevailed throughout the 1990s, during the privatisation of the 
incumbent provider (Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited, hereafter Telecom) in 
1990, the entry of competitive fixed-line infrastructure and services suppliers from 1991, the 
establishment and growth of mobile market competition from 1994, the expansion of the 
commercial internet from 1996 and the consequent emergence of the ‘information economy’ 
(Howell & Obren, 2003).  
 
Contemporaneously, New Zealand emerged as one of the earliest-adopting and highest-
utilising OECD countries in respect of most of the demand-side indicators typically used to 
assess improved economic performance arising from the Internet, such as the number of 
individuals connected, the number of hours spent online, the number of secure servers per 
capita, the number of transactions per secure server and the number and use of autonomous 
and routed IP addresses per capita (Howell & Marriott, 2004; Howell, 2006; 2007).  
Nonetheless, the country’s broadband uptake has been low by OECD standards (Howell, 
2003; 2006).   
 
Since 2000, however, there has been a sea-change in the New Zealand approach to 
telecommunications regulation.   Following a Ministerial Inquiry into the industry in 20001, a 
                                                     
1 Ministerial Inquiry Into Telecommunications http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/StandardSummary____16318.aspx  
7/20/2008 -3- 3
Telecommunications Commissioner was established in 2002 to oversee industry activity2, an 
inquiry was held in 2003 on the merits of unbundling the local loop3, limited bitstream access 
was granted in 20044, full unbundling and the ability to undertake standard terms 
determinations were mandated in 20065 and in 2007, the Telecommunications Minister 
announced his intention to instruct Telecom to operationally separate its network activities 
from its wholesale and retail activities6 and that he, rather than the Telecommunications 
Commissioner, would take the lead in overseeing the separation process7.  Also in 2007, the 
Minister of Economic Development directly brokered a fixed-to-mobile termination 
agreement with the two mobile network operators after the Minister of Communications twice 
rejected the Commissioner’s recommendations to regulate prices and terms in this market8.    
 
The swing of New Zealand’s regulatory pendulum from light-handed regulation relying 
predominantly upon competition law to increasingly more stringent industry-specific 
regulation and arguably even a return to political control of sector strategy (Howell, 2008a) 
implies that the light-handed competition law-based regime failed to deliver on its objectives.  
That the industry-specific regulation that replaced it has also rendered less than satisfactory 
performance is suggested by successively stronger regulatory and finally political 
intervention.  This paper seeks to test these contentions by using empirical evidence to 
examine the absolute and comparative performance of the sector under each regime.  The 
performance of New Zealand’s telecommunications sector under the competition law regime 
in particular, relative to both the contemporaneous performance of industry-specific regulated 
industries in other OECD countries and the New Zealand industry-specific regime that 
replaced it offers important insights for other countries as they contemplate the removal of 
aspects of industry-specific regulation in favour of greater reliance upon competition law to 
govern sector interactions.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 1, a set of measurement criteria to assess sector 
performance are developed.  Section 2 assesses the performance of the competition law-based 
regime against these criteria relative to both the initial New Zealand conditions and other 
OECD countries.  In Section 3, the performance of the industry-specific regulatory regime is 
assessed.  Section 4 summarises and concludes.   
 
                                                     
2 Commerce Commission http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Overview.aspx  
3 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/LocalLoopUnbundling/Overview.aspx  
4http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/Unbundling-
BitstreamServices/correspondenceandrelateddocuments.aspx  
5 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____20266.aspx  




1. Developing a Performance Measurement Framework 
Consistent with any performance assessment exercise, performance measures and 
benchmarks must be defined.  From an economist’s perspective, the appropriate measure to 
use is economic efficiency (total welfare) – the sum of consumer and producer surplus 
(Carlton & Perloff, 2005:682). The solitary justification for either the enactment and 
enforcement of competition law or the application of industry-specific regulation is that it 
leads to increases in efficiency.  If total welfare increases (decreases) as a consequence of an 
intervention/regime relative to a base starting point or counterfactual, then the 
intervention/regime can be adjudged as more successful (less successful), relative to the 
benchmark against which the comparison was made.   
 
1.1 Market Share Does Not Accurately Measure Welfare Gains 
Competition law and its associated jurisprudence are based upon the premise that pursuit of 
competition is justified when such pursuit leads to increased efficiency – that is, efficiency is 
the ‘end’ objective and competition is just one of a number of means towards that end.  When 
pursuit of competition is contraindicative to the pursuit of efficiency (for example, in some 
high fixed or sunk cost industries where too much competition may result in inefficiently low 
levels of investment), then if competition law is sufficiently inflexible or unable to give due 
weight to efficiency-related issues, industry-specific regulation may be able to deliver more 
efficient outcomes (Carlton and Picker, 2007; Howell, 2008a).   
 
It is therefore insufficient to adjudge the performance of a market under either competition 
law or industry-specific regulation by competition metrics alone. Whilst the degree of 
competitiveness measured by market shares or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), and 
the Likelihood of Entry (LET) and Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price 
(SSNIP) tests commonly used to assess market performance9 provide information about 
market structure, they do not take account of the actual behaviour of the market participants 
in response to the wide range of legal, regulatory and commercial obligations under which 
they interact.  Neither do these criteria take account of underlying economic characteristics of 
the markets concerned that render the pursuit of less concentrated markets alone a poor proxy 
for the pursuit of either increased welfare or a realistic competitive process (Alleman & 
Rappoport, 2005).  For example, in markets characterised by high fixed and sunk costs, more 
intense price competition has been shown to result in a smaller number of firms at equilibrium 
                                                     
9 For example, in as prevails in New Zealand’s Mergers and Acquisitions process – see 
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/Publications/ContentFiles/Documents/MergersandAcquisitionsGuidelines.PDF  
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than either less intense competition or perfect collusion (Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak, 2007:349-
50).   
1.2 Prices Best Capture (Static) Consumer Welfare 
Rather, in order to derive a reliable view of the efficiency-related outcomes of the ensuing 
market interactions, the information about market structure derived from market shares, HHI, 
LET and SSNIP calculations must be assessed alongside other information that captures 
behavioural characteristics arising from responses to the incentives offered by the sector’s 
specific contractual and institutional design.  For example, in competition law regimes, the 
risks and penalties arising from likely prosecution for exertion of a dominant position may 
induce a dominant firm to charge prices close to the competitive level, even though it faces 
little actual competition.  Furthermore, fringe competitors can impose disciplines upon prices 
charged by dominant firms (Carlton & Perloff, 2005:110-119) which may not be accurately 
reflected in structural assessments alone, and where the gains accrued may be achieved more 
cost-effectively than from ex ante regulatory provisions requiring extensive and costly 
monitoring and enforcement.  Therefore, regardless of any assessment of the presence of 
market power, prices in a market arguably offer a superior assessment of actual market 
performance.  Specifically, they directly reflect the welfare of consumers arising from actual 
sector interactions and therefore provide a more accurate barometer of welfare gains than 
market concentration measures (Hausman & Sidak, 2007).   
 
Comparative performance can be assessed using benchmarked prices between markets or in 
one market across time. Furthermore, benchmarked comparisons of actual market 
performance are more realistic than comparisons of a single market benchmarked against a 
selected theoretical ideal (e.g. ‘perfectly competitive’ TELRIC or TSLRIC prices) which is 
rarely if ever evidenced in practice. For example, Hausman and Sidak (2007) use 
benchmarked prices in one market in one country deemed competitive on the basis of 
structural parameters to illustrate that lower prices in the same market in another country that 
had been adjudged not sufficiently competitive on the basis of the same structural parameters 
was performing more efficiently and therefore better serving the long-term interests of its 
consumers than the supposedly more competitive market.  Individual prices can be used for 
comparing individual markets, whilst price indices can be used to compare sector-wide 
performance over a much larger basket of products and services.  The proportional changes 
recorded using indices also enable direct and relevant comparisons to be made between 
markets of very different size.  
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In telecommunications markets, the number of connections has been widely used as a proxy 
measure of consumer welfare, as it is presumed that as prices decrease, the number of 
connections, and therefore consumer welfare, increases.  In a mature market constrained by 
exertion of market power, prices will be higher than efficient and the number of connections 
will be lower than efficient.  In such circumstances, connection numbers in have been used to 
proxy consumer welfare changes in regulated markets, simply because changes in connection 
numbers are easier to capture and compare as a measure of change in consumer welfare 
actually derived than more volatile pricing data (Melody, 2005).  However, in markets for 
emerging products, connection numbers are a less reliable proxy for consumer welfare 
conferred, as many factors other than price or exertion of market power may affect the rate of 
purchase (e.g. wealth effects, availability of applications, information asymmetries, varying 
customer valuations – Howell, 2008).  For the purposes of this paper, connection numbers 
will not be used as a primary measure of performance, except where they either confirm or 
defy price-based analyses or suggest that other anomalies in market performance may exist.   
 
As with the number of connections, levels of usage (e.g. voice minutes, megabytes 
downloaded) are also typically a function of price, with low prices leading to higher usage 
and thus the accrual of higher levels of consumer welfare.  Normally, changes in usage prices 
are sufficient to imply changes in consumer welfare.  However, measuring usage levels 
becomes important in capturing consumer welfare when that usage is effectively unpriced 
(e.g. in the case of ‘flat rate’ tariffs, where usage is subsidised from connection charges, and 
heavy users are effectively subsidised by light users).  For the purposes of this paper, given 
the obligations upon the main provider to supply ‘flat rate’ local voice telephony services and 
the common use of flat rate pricing for internet connections, usage will be used to further 
assist in the assessment of consumer welfare accrued.   
 
1.3 Revenues, Producer Surplus, and Price Benchmarking 
Producer surplus is typically measured as revenue less the costs of production and the 
opportunity cost capital.  A producer with market power charging prices in excess of the costs 
of production and capital will thus accrue higher revenues for a given volume of output than 
one with equivalent costs charging the ‘efficient’ cost-based price.  Thus, just as with price 
benchmarking, revenue benchmarking against a presumed ‘competitive’ revenue level can be 
used to assess the likely extent of prices being charged in excess of cost.  If observed 
revenues are higher than the benchmark revenues, then higher profits are being made in the 
observed market than in the benchmark one – producer surplus is higher.   
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However, producer surplus has to be considered in conjunction with the level of consumer 
surplus (assessed from prices and/or quantities) to make an assessment of overall welfare 
levels. If both revenues and prices are higher than the benchmark levels, then there is a 
transfer of welfare from consumers to producers, and it is likely the observed market is 
operating less efficiently (i.e. at lower levels of consumption) than the benchmarked one.  
Higher prices and lower revenues are consistent with lower levels of consumer welfare due to 
low usage as would be indicated by high prices alone.  By contrast, lower prices and higher 
revenues suggest lower-cost production and higher utilisation, but not any apparently greater 
exertion of market power.  Simply, consumer welfare is higher due to higher usage at the 
lower prices.  Lower prices and lower revenues may occur if there are more extensive supply 
constraints, which can be cross-checked against utilisation evidence.  If utilisation is higher, 
then lower prices and lower revenues might indicate a market where welfare accrued is 
allocated predominantly to consumers rather than producers (for example, where price 
controls or other regulation limits the extent to which producers can share in the market 
proceeds).   
 
1.4 Dynamic Efficiency: Investment Levels, Timing and Entry Patterns 
Revenues, retail prices, the number of connections and usage provide an assessment only of 
the static component of efficiency.  They do not take account of dynamic efficiency – the 
gains that come from product and process innovation.  Whilst dynamic efficiency is 
notoriously difficult to measure, a range of factors can be used to assess performance in this 
dimension.   
 
The level and timing of investment in both existing and new infrastructures are key measures.  
In principle, if the correct incentives are in place, new and/or cheaper technologies will be 
introduced in a timely manner, leading to increases in welfare from both increased consumer 
surplus from more highly-valued or lower-priced products, and increased producer surplus 
from either reduced costs or new profit-making opportunities (Hausman & Sidak, 2005:183).  
New technologies, however, require investments to be made, which will be captured in 
records of investment levels.  Where absence of competition reduces the need for a firm to 
invest in new technologies, then new, consumer welfare-enhancing investments can be 
deferred, especially if there are hard-to-assess risks associated with the investment.  Total 
investments are likely therefore to be less than in the competitive case, and the time at which 
new technologies are made available to consumers will be delayed (Guthrie, 2006).  Where 
competition is geographically uneven, a provider with market power may choose only to 
invest in the new technologies in areas where competition exists, limiting the total investment 
7/20/2008 -8- 8
made and the size of the customer pool that can purchase the new products and services.  
Once again, benchmarking against a comparator across the extent of the possible consumer 
market enables relative performance assessments to be made.   
 
High levels of market concentration are associated with lower levels of dynamic efficiency 
due to presumed reduction in rivalry between the firms concerned.  However, absence of 
actual competition on its own is insufficient for a finding of low levels of dynamic efficiency 
gains without examining the wider regulatory environment.  If entry barriers are low, then the 
simple threat of entry may be sufficient to induce earlier commitment and higher levels of 
investment than if such entry was not likely (e.g. if restricted by the need to first acquire a 
licence).   
 
1.5 Transaction Costs and Regime Efficiency 
Whilst static and dynamic efficiency measures captured in prices, revenues, connection, 
usage, investment levels and investment timing measure sector performance at the operational 
level, overall sector efficiency must take into account the total costs creating, monitoring and 
enforcing the legal and institutional framework in which the sector operates.  This includes 
the court processes for competition law-governed regimes, and the operation of the regulatory 
bodies under industry-specific regulation (Evans & Quigley, 2000).  The costs may be both 
tangible, in respect of the costs actually expended, which affect static efficiency, and 
intangible in respect of prospective gains foregone, a dynamic efficiency measure.  For 
example, some regulatory obligations such as local loop unbundling have been implicated in 
delays in investing in new technologies, with consequent reductions in the ability of 
consumers to accrue the gains from using superior technologies (Hausman & Sidak, 2005).   
 
1.6 Selecting the Benchmarks for Assessing New Zealand’s Performance 
A comprehensive comparative assessment of the performance of New Zealand’s regimes 
must therefore be based upon a comprehensive set of measures of static and dynamic 
efficiency, covering the prices, revenues, connection rates, usage levels, investment levels, 
investment timing and institutional governance costs.  Whilst clearly, the relative performance 
of the industry-specific regulatory regime can be benchmarked to that of the competition law-




For the purposes of this paper, given the interest that New Zealand’s competition law-
governed regime has engendered as the first in the world to eschew industry-specific 
regulation, its performance will be benchmarked against performance metrics over the same 
period of other selected OECD countries and the OECD average.  Whilst it is recognised that 
the OECD average is an amalgamation of many different regimes, the common factor linking 
all other countries is that their telecommunications markets were governed primarily by 
industry-specific regulation.   
 
If on balance over all of the chosen metrics the New Zealand competition law-based regime 
can be shown to be operating less efficiently than the average OECD country over the period 
1987-2001, then it can be concluded that the introduction of industry-specific regulation in 
2001 might be justified in the pursuit of increasing the efficiency of the New Zealand 
telecommunications sector10.  If, however, it is found to be operating more efficiently than the 
average OECD country, then the introduction of industry-specific regulation of the form 
promulgated as ‘best practice’ by the OECD and applying over the period 2002-2007 might 
be expected to result in reductions in efficiency relative to the New Zealand competition law-
based benchmark.  If the latter is shown to be the case, then increasingly stronger industry-
specific regulatory intervention is unlikely to lead to increased efficiency – indeed, such 
actions would likely be associated with further declines in the performance of the key metrics 
observed.   
 
2. The Competition Law-Governed Period 1987-2001 
New Zealand’s ‘light-handed’ telecommunications regime based upon the Commerce Act 
1986, precluding the exertion of a dominant position (Section 36), and the 
Telecommunications Act 1987, was predicated upon a government policy of pursuing 
economic efficiency (in all of its productive, allocative and dynamic dimensions) and 
“achieving, wherever possible, a competitive environment in which markets can operate 
relatively free from subsequent government involvement” (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson & 
Teece, 1996:1863).  Industry-specific regulation was eschewed in part due to its high fixed 
costs in relation to the very small size of the New Zealand market (only 4 million citizens) 
and the view that “across the world, this style of regulation has proven itself to be inflexible, 
                                                     
10 It is noted that the 2000 Inquiry that recommended the introduction of industry-specific regulation took as its performance 
benchmark for the sector that of perfect static efficiency.  As the prices charged by the incumbent were deemed not to be 
perfectly competitive prices, intervention was recommended.  However, in respect of dynamic efficiency, regulation of newer 
services (e.g. ADSL) were nor recommended to be subject to regulation (Howell, 2007 interpreting the Ministerial Inquiry into 
Telecommunications report http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/StandardSummary____16318.aspx
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overly bureaucratic and very costly to administer” (Blanchard, 1995:474) – that is, transaction 
cost-intensive.   
 
The use of competition law in New Zealand as the primary means of governing interactions in 
network and infrastructure industries such as telecommunications, electricity, railways and 
airways was consistent with its use across all other industries in the small economy, given the 
very high concentration levels observed overall in New Zealand as firms moved wherever 
possible to take advantage of horizontal and vertical scale and scope economies. Arnold, 
Boles de Boer & Evans (2004) observe three firm concentration ratios exceed 90% in nearly 
all of New Zealand’s significant industry sectors, with many (e.g. supermarkets) having only 
two significant firms.  
 
2.1 A ‘Lightly-regulated’ but not ‘Unregulated’ Sector 
The Telecommunications Act 1987 removed all entry barriers in the provision of both 
services and equipment from the New Zealand market11.  However, contrary to assertions that 
competition law alone governed sector activities (e.g. Spiller & Cardilli, 1997), the 
Commerce Act (Part IV) contained provisions for Ministerially-imposed price control in the 
event of repeated transgressions of Section 36 by firms with a dominant position, and the 
Telecommunications Act imposed reporting obligations upon the incumbent provider 
Telecom.  Furthermore, when Telecom was privatised in 1990, the new owners entered into 
an agreement with the government, known initially as the ‘Kiwi Share’ and from 2001 the 
Telecommunications Service Order (TSO). 
 
Under the ‘Kiwi Share’, Telecom was bound to guarantee that the price of residential 
telephone rentals would not rise faster than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) unless profits 
were unreasonably impaired (the ‘price cap’ obligation), rural residential rental prices would 
not exceed urban residential rentals (the ‘universal service’ obligation) and residential 
customers would continue to be offered a tariff with no charges for local calls (the ‘free local 
calling’ obligation) 12.  These obligations preserved New Zealand’s long history of wealth 
transfers between consumers via universal service prices and free local calling prevailing 
since 1880 (Howell, 2007; Wilson, 1994), and ensured that New Zealand’s ‘free local calling’ 
zones, amongst the most extensive in the OECD (NZIER, 2005), remained intact in the 
privatised, deregulated environment.   
                                                     
11 It is one of the very few countries where no licence is required to operate (Lim & Chen, 2008) 
12 Changes to prices (outside these guidelines) or any of the the other terms, required the approval of the Minister of 
Communications.  
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 Competitive entry occurred rapidly in both the fixed and mobile markets.  Clear 
Communications (subsequently TelstraClear) entered the fixed line market in 199113, gaining 
market shares of 20% and 23% in the long-distance and international markets respectively in 
its first five years of operation (McTigue, 1998).  Its impact on the local calling market was 
initially small, due in part to a protracted dispute with Telecom over local interconnection 
charging (the key part of the dispute being the legitimate charging method to use given 
Telecom’s need to recover the costs of the ‘Kiwi Share’ social obligations – Howell, 2007:17-
20)14, but following the resolution of the case by the Privy Council in 1994 in favour of 
Telecom, and a Ministerial Review in 1995 confirming that the regulatory arrangements 
would not change (MoC/Treasury, 1995), entry activity increased.  Telstra entered in 
November 1996, Saturn in June 1997 and Compass in September 1998 (Karel, 2003).  
Despite the extent of competitive entry of alternative service and infrastructure providers in 
the fixed line market (Howell & Obren (2003) record 19 registered providers in 2003), with 
high uptake of lines in those areas where duplicate technologies were available (anecdotally 
up to 25% of homes in those areas passed by Saturn (subsequently TelstraClear), nationwide 
the number of lines sold by competitors remained small (less than 4% in 2003 – Howell & 
Obren, 2003). 
 
Mobile competitive entry occurred in 1994, when BellSouth first began selling services on its 
GSM network in competition to Telecom’s TDMA and subsequently CDMA-based network 
services15. Whilst Telecom held an early market advantage, BellSouth (subsequently 
Vodafone) quickly developed a significant market presence, having approximately one third 
of the market by connections and slightly more by call minute volumes by the end of 200016. 
 
                                                     
13 Clear Corporation, held by majority owners MCI International and Bell Canada Enterprises, with minor partners New Zealand 
Railways, Television New Zealand, and Todd Corporation (Boles de Boer and Evans, 1996), entered the market using the then 
New Zealand Railways fixed fibre-optic cable to bypass the Telecom network.  Clear invested in the provision of local 
infrastructures servicing the business districts in most New Zealand cities, as well as the domestic and international long-distance 
markets (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece, 1996). In 1991, Saturn Communications was established on the Kapiti Coast, 
near Wellington, providing telephony and television services via fibre-optic cable.  Telstra Corporation (Australia) established 
Telstra New Zealand in 1996.  Telstra New Zealand purchased Saturn in 1999 and Clear in 2001, forming TelstraClear Ltd on 
December 15 2001 http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/companyinfo/history.cfm. 
14 The use by Telecom of the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), which included a margin to recover the costs of 
providing social services, was deemed to be what a competitive firm would charge in the same circumstances.  Moreover, Clear 
had failed to demonstrate that Telecom’s prices were indeed in excess of costs, even including the component to recover social 
obligation costs.   
15 BellSouth started its GSM cellphone service in 1994 (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece, 1996). Vodafone purchased 
BellSouth in November 1998, forming Vodafone New Zealand http://www.vodafone.co.nz/personal/about/company-information/
16 Data from ISCR Telecommunications Database derived from market shares reported by the firms in quarterly reports.  
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2.2 Prices and Static Efficiency in the Fixed Line Market 
Despite the apparent lack of competition in the fixed line market, the New Zealand residential 
price index for fixed line services over the period 1991 to 2001 (indexed to 1991 prices) 
(Figure 1) shows substantial decreases occurred in all of connection (to 90% of 2001 levels in 
2001), long distance (36% of 1991 levels in 2001) and the bundle of combined line rental and 
calling charges (65% of 1991 levels in 2001).  This suggests that under the competition law-
governed regime, residential consumers enjoyed substantial gains in welfare over the 1990s 
relative to the position in 1991 when Telecom was listed on the New Zealand stock exchange.  
Whilst clearly competition in long-distance calling was a significant factor in these prices 
falling, it is notable that fixed line rentals also fell in real terms, despite the very small amount 
of actual competition in the market nationwide in the fixed line rental market. 
 
2.2.1 Larger Relative Consumer Welfare Gains from PSTN Price Falls 
In practice, apart from small changes in 1992 and adjustments in the few areas where 
facilities-based entry occurred, Telecom’s nominal prices charged for residential line rentals 
remained unchanged across the 1990s.  Consequently, the real price fell steadily across the 
decade.  The consistent nominal line rental charge prevailed in part because the ‘price cap’ 
Kiwi Share obligation made it difficult for the firm to raise this price without first seeking 
political approval.  In addition, the sale of Telecom to initially predominantly American 
owners meant any price rises, even if within the agreed bounds, would attract political interest 
as a consequence of a populist perception of ‘expropriation’ of New Zealand resources by 
foreigners.  Threat of political attention thereby offered an additional constraint upon the 
temptation for Telecom to exert its market power by raising prices. 
 
Figure 2 shows the OECD Telephone Charge Time Series (indexed to 1990) up to 2007.  
Whilst the two indices are not strictly directly comparable due to the bundles being based 
upon different calling baskets, a sense of the extent of the welfare gains made by New 
Zealand consumers relative to the average OECD consumer over the 1990s can be discerned.  
Over approximately the same time period (the OECD time series is indexed to 1990), the 
average OECD line rental (largely comparable to the New Zealand line rental in Figure 1) 
rose to more than 120% of its 1990 level by 2001, whilst the bundle of line rental and calling 
(broadly comparable to the New Zealand residential telephone service in Figure 1) fell to 
around only 80% of its 1990 level by 2001.   
 
Comparative benchmarking thus suggests that the relative welfare gains to New Zealand 
residential consumers from lower prices over the period 1990-2001 were substantially greater 
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than those accrued by the average OECD consumer of fixed line telephony services.  A large 
proportion of the gains are likely due to New Zealand line rentals not being adjusted upwards, 
as occurred in most of the rest of the OECD over this period when the advent of competition 
led to the requirement in most other OECD countries that providers ‘unbundle’ (or 
‘rebalance’) connection and calling charges, thereby removing the cross-subsidy from calling 
(both local and long-distance) to connections that had been implemented in part to increase 
the number of connections sold to price-sensitive residential consumers (Laffont & Tirole, 
2002).  Despite the dominant position of the incumbent provider, threat of legal action over 
abuse of that dominance combined with the price cap obligation of the Kiwi Share and its 
associated political connotations appear to have resulted in a greater proportionate welfare 
gain for New Zealanders than delivered under industry-specific regulatory regimes in the rest 
of the OECD. 
 
2.2.2 Enhanced Gains From ‘Free Local Calling’ 
 ‘Rebalancing’ of line rentals and local call charges did not take place in the New Zealand 
residential market because the ‘free local calling’ obligation precluded Telecom from 
undertaking such an exercise (although rebalancing was undertaken in the business market, 
where line rentals were reduced and call charges introduced for the first time in 1992).  Given 
the extensive local calling areas and zero-priced residential calls, New Zealand calling 
patterns differ substantially from countries where local call charging prevails (NZIER, 2005).  
Telecom management reports in 2003 recording the volumes of chargeable and unchargeable 
minutes on the PSTN indicate that only 20% of traffic in that year was able to be charged.  By 
benchmarking chargeable minutes between Finland and New Zealand, Howell & Sangekar 
(2008) find that New Zealand local calling volumes per line were around four times those 
observed in Finland, most likely as a consequence of the ‘free local calling’ obligation.   
 
The advent of the internet as a significant commercial force had significant ramifications for 
the New Zealand fixed line telephony market, due to the ‘free local calling’ obligation and the 
initial use of dial-up modems as the predominant method of internet connection.  Figure 3 
shows the growth of internet traffic in New Zealand relative to other calling volumes.  As the 
telephony component of internet calling was not charged, New Zealand dial-up internet use 
was extremely prolific compared to those countries where local call charging prevailed 
(OECD, 2000).  New Zealand internet service providers (ISPs) were amongst the first to offer 
flat-rate charges for their services (Enright, 2000), leading to New Zealand rapidly becoming 
one of the most highly-connected and highest-using internet consumer markets in the OECD.  
Figure 4 shows that at the peak of dial-up usage in 2003, New Zealand’s 850,000 dial-up 
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internet users were consuming on average 35 hours per month (more than one hour per day) 
connected to their ISPs over the PSTN.    
 
Unlike in countries where local call charging prevailed, none of the increased PSTN usage by 
residential consumers for internet connection generated any additional revenue for Telecom.  
Practically all of the PSTN usage servicing dial-up internet usage in New Zealand was 
accrued as consumer surplus.  As the New Zealand price index in Figure 1 does not take 
account of the additional volumes of New Zealand internet usage relative of that in other 
OECD countries charging for the service, the extent of the welfare gains in terms of the actual 
price paid per minute of PSTN connectivity fell by a much greater extent in New Zealand 
than is reflected in the comparator OECD index.  The extent of the consumer welfare gain by 
New Zealanders across the 1990s in respect of PSTN charging was therefore very much 
greater than that enjoyed by other OECD residents, due to ‘free local calling’ resulting in a 
higher level of consumption per user (i.e. the marginal dial-up internet user in New Zealand 
had a lower valuation per minute of usage than the average OECD user, as New Zealand users 
consumed to the point where marginal value of use was zero rather than to the point where the 
marginal value equalled the cost per minute of the call).   
 
2.2.3 Revenues Confirm Consumer Welfare Gains from Increased Usage 
The effect of ‘free local calling’ on Telecom revenues is evidenced in Figure 5, which 
benchmarks revenues in New Zealand,  the OECD as an aggregate and selected comparator 
countries between 1991 and 2002, indexed to 1997 when dial-up  internet use began to be a 
significant factor.  Figure 5 shows that whilst New Zealand’s revenues as a proportion of 
1997 revenues tracked the OECD average between 1991 and 1997, after 1997, whilst OECD 
average revenues grew to 135% of their 1997 levels by 2002, New Zealand revenues 
remained static, exceeding 1997 levels in nominal terms only once in the period (2002) and 
then by only a very small margin.  By contrast, Korean revenues grew to 250% of 1997 levels 
and the United States to 140%.  Only Norway and the United Kingdom recorded revenue 
indexes lower than New Zealand over the entire period 1997 to 2002.  Australia had revenues 
in excess of 1997 levels in all years except 2002.  
 
Revenue figures thus confirm the presumption that not only did New Zealand exhibit much 
higher levels of internet use than the average OECD country over the 1990s, but that the gains 
from this additional use were appropriated almost totally by consumers.  Producer gains from 
this increased use were non-existent..   The gain by New Zealand consumers relative to other 
OECD countries from the advent of the internet was therefore very much larger due to the 
charging arrangements prevailing.  The combined arrangements of both competition law 
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governance, and the specific provisions of New Zealand’s ‘light-handed’ regulatory regime – 
the ‘price cap’ and ‘free local calling’ obligations of the ‘Kiwi Share’ – thus appear to have 
delivered superior static efficiency gains in the form of increased consumer welfare than the 
‘average’ OECD industry-specific regulatory arrangements. 
 
2.3 Dynamic Efficiency: Investment and New Technologies 
Despite the substantial static efficiency gains accrued, it might have been expected that 
Telecom’s dominant position would result in it delaying investment in new technologies – 
namely broadband services.  The evidence, however, does not bear this out.   
 
2.3.1 Early, Widespread, Low-Priced and High Quality ADSL 
Rather than being a laggard, Telecom invested early and extensively in ADSL.  When the first 
commercial ADSL services were offered in Wellington from January 1999, New Zealand 
became only the third OECD country after the United States and Canada to provide the 
technology.  Nationwide rollout proceeded rapidly, with services available to 85% of 
consumers (by lines) by 2002 (extended to 94% by 2007 (OECD, 2008:34) but due to 
geographic and technological constraints this is unlikely to be exceeded).  Moreover, the base 
level product installed was a fast 2Mbps service, with 128kbps and 256kbps products being 
installed only when firstly consumer preferences and secondly government purchasing 
requirements for subsidised rural connection programmes demanded them (Howell, 2003).    
 
Whilst it might also have been expected that the monopoly provider would have levied high 
prices for the new (monopoly) service, the evidence confirms that this did not occur either.  
OECD (2001) price benchmarking showed that in 2001 the prices for the New Zealand ADSL 
products were 2nd and 3rd lowest in the OECD after price leader Korea OECD.  New 
Zealand’s low prices and comparatively high speed of services offered have continued across 
the 2000s.  OECD (2008) benchmarking shows that in October 2007, New Zealand had the 
seventh lowest monthly subscription prices (Figure 1.14, p 42), the 7th-lowest prices per 
megabit second17 (Figure 1.15, p 43) and the 8th fastest download speeds offered by an 
incumbent operator (Figure 1.16, p 44), despite being ranked only 20th in the number of 
connections per capita in June 2007 (Figure 1.4, p 25).  
 
Thus, in terms of both the timing and availability of new services, the arrangements in place 
during the 1990s do not appear to have hampered the supply side investment in and pricing of 
                                                     
17 Prices are expressed in United States dollars, correcting for the purchasing power parity of each country.  
7/20/2008 -16- 16
new technologies.  The potential for dynamic efficiency gains appears to be on average 
greater in New Zealand than in the average OECD country.  The apparently perplexing New 
Zealand enigma is why the demand side of the market, already one of the most extensively 
using dial-up internet countries, has failed to rapidly convert that extensive usage to 
broadband18.   
 
2.3.2 ‘Kiwi Share’ and Investment Incentives 
Whilst New Zealand’s liberal entry provisions led to investment by multiple providers in 
multiple competing technologies (Ethernet LAN in 1995, satellite in 1998, cable in 1999, 
wireless in 2002 and mobile broadband in 2005 – Howell, 2007), each (except for satellite, 
which was available nationwide) offered only fringe competition to Telecom.  Yet due to 
New Zealand’s long history of universal service pricing, fringe competition has had a 
significant effect on prices in the market.  Whilst there was no ‘Kiwi Share’ obligation to do 
so, Telecom offered ADSL services nationwide at the identical tariffs, independent of the 
different costs or differing extent of local competition.  Whilst satellite was the early price 
leader, the prices for all of the technologies (when accounting for speed and other 
differentiating factors) have converged to very similar levels nationwide, irrespective of the 
provider identity or actual market presence (Howell, 2003). 
 
The early introduction, low pricing and wide availability of ADSL are also due in large part to 
Telecom’s ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations. The interconnection agreement agreed in 1996 between 
Telecom and Clear, which became the prototype for all other network contracts, saw the 
network owner whose customer originated a call paying a termination charge to the operator 
on whose network the call terminated.  With the emergence of the internet, as a consequence 
of ‘free local calling’, PSTN call minutes grew exponentially (Figure 3), creating an arbitrage 
opportunity for network operators who could sign up a disproportionate number of the ISPs as 
customers.   
 
2.3.3 Strategic Responses to Competitor Actions 
Telecom’s competitors seized upon the arbitrage opportunity.  Karel (2003) notes significant 
cash payments were made to ISPs to join rival networks, and these payments were shared 
further with consumers as discounted or even free ISP account fees.  The result was a highly 
competitive ISP market, with low ISP charges and free PSTN access.  Boles de Boer, Enright 
& Evans (2000) note that New Zealand ISP charges were between 13% and 30% lower than 
Australian charges at the time, despite New Zealand having only one third of the number of 
                                                     
18 See Howell (2007; 2008b) for a full discussion.  
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ISPs per capita.  Whilst New Zealand concentration levels were higher, the extent of rivalry 
was very much greater, and consumer welfare correspondingly higher as the ISPs shared the 
interconnection gains with consumers.  The combined low ISP and PSTN charging for 
internet use likely accounts for the very low New Zealand sector revenues (below even 1997 
levels) in Figure 4 compared to other countries and the OECD average.  
 
Because of the ‘free local calling’ obligation, and because the vast majority of internet calls 
originated on its network, Telecom faced huge losses from contractual arbitrage as the ‘free 
local calling’ obligation precluded it for charging for the internet calls.  An average internet 
user signed up to a non Telecom-affiliated ISP in 1999 was generating an interconnect 
obligation for Telecom of $36 for a monthly rental (including all local calls) of only $30 
(Howell, 2007).  Due to the revenue-sharing incentives offered by Telecom’s competitors, 
non-Telecom ISPs likely attracted a disproportionate share of the high volume users, meaning 
the interconnection losses to Telecom from the 50% of ISP customers not served by its 
proprietary ISP Xtra likely substantially exceeded the average of $6 per month per account. 
 
Telecom’s strategy to invest early in high-speed ADSL priced very cheaply was half of a two-
pronged strategy to avert the cash flows to competitors.  If high-using dial-up internet users 
(who were causing most of the interconnect losses) could be induced to migrate early to new 
chargeable broadband connections, then losses could be averted.  Indeed, if the dial-up 
telephony account could be tied to the ADSL account, then some of the notional ‘savings’ 
from the interconnection costs and PSTN internet calls averted could be shared with the 
consumer via an ADSL account where the connection was priced below cost, and the firm 
would still be in a stronger financial position than under the status quo.  In order to induce 
even low-volume users to switch, Telecom sold ADSL connections under a variety of two-
part tariffs, where connection and usage were charged separately (a charging policy adopted 
by all of the competing providers, even though they did not face the same interconnection and 
free local calling pressures)19.    
 
Despite these inducements, initial ADSL uptake was sluggish, leading Telecom in September 
1999 to impose a retail charge of 2c per minute (the termination charge) for internet calls 
made to non Telecom-affiliated ISPs for all calls made after ten free hours a month had been 
consumed (which still constituted an interconnect liability to Telecom of $12 per month for 
every consumer calling a non-Telecom ISP – setting a bound on the notional loss that 
                                                     
19  In part due to the fact that over 95% of New Zealand internet traffic comes from overseas over the monopoly Southern Cross 
Cable, which due to peering agreements sees New Zealand internet users paying all of the costs of both uploaded and 
downloaded traffic across this trans-Pacific cable. 
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Telecom could incur on an ADSL connection and still be in no worse a position than under 
the status quo).  This action, which became known as the ‘0867’ case after the calling prefix 
of Telecom-affiliated ISPs, was approved by the Minister under the provisions of the ‘Kiwi 
Share’, but the Commerce Commission, responding to complaints by Telecom’s competitors, 
laid a charge under Section 36 of the Commerce Act alleging that Telecom’s action in 
instituting the charge constituted an anti-competitive exertion of its dominant position.  The 
High Court ultimately decided that Telecom’s actions did not constitute a breach of Section 
36.  The ‘0867’ charges went ahead, the cash losses ceased, and the interconnection 
agreements ran their full length, being replaced in 2001 by a ‘bill and keep’ agreement (Evans 
& Quigley, 2000), and ultimately in 2002 by regulated rates under industry-specific 
regulation (Howell, 2007).  
 
2.4 Transaction Costs 
Whilst there were clearly superior gains for New Zealand consumers at the expense of 
Telecom over the 1990s as a consequence of the interaction of the competition law regime 
and the ‘Kiwi Share’ provisions, and with few apparent impediments to investments in new 
technologies, the question of the systemic transaction costs incurred in order to appropriate 
these gains must be considered.  Only two cases alleging a breach of Telecom’s dominant 
position were brought during the 1990s, and in neither case was it found that Telecom had 
transgressed.  Nonetheless, criticisms were made about the process of bringing a case under 
Section 36.  These centred around the time taken to resolve a court case, and the costs of such 
actions.   
 
2.4.1 Costs of Court Cases 
The ‘Clear’ case took three years and hearings in three courts (High Court, Court of Appeal 
and the Privy Council) to be resolved.  The ‘0867’ case brought in 1999, was finally 
adjudicated in 2008 – a span of nine years.  Both involved substantial costs, in terms of expert 
evidence and the provision (in many cases the recreation) of key information regarding the 
actions undertaken by the various parties.  Nonetheless, these costs constitute the sole out-of-
pocket expenses incurred under the competition law-governed regime. 
 
It is somewhat harder to quantify what opportunity costs might have been foregone as a 
consequence of the competition law regime.  Whilst plausibly the absence of a regulatory 
regime requiring detailed reporting of prices, costs and other data may have made it harder for 
firms to adjudge the likelihood of Telecom’s prices being anti-competitive when making the 
decision about whether to take a Section 36 case (Blanchard, 1994a; 1994b), ex post analysis 
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of the form above suggests that the small number of cases observed may have been because 
few breaches were actually incurred.  Moreover, if the court-based system is working 
efficiently, cases should only be brought if the likely gains (weighted by the probability of the 
result being favourable) exceed the costs of doing so. 
 
2.4.2 Court Processes and Dynamic Efficiency Gains from Entry 
It has also been suggested that firms may have delayed entering the market whilst awaiting 
the result of the court actions brought by another firm (MoC/Treasury, 1995).  However, to 
bring a case, a contract must actually have struck (or in the case of ‘0867’, a different product 
mix must be brought to market).  Clear could still transact with customers on the basis of the 
initial interconnection agreement, even whilst it was under dispute.  Some gains in welfare 
could therefore potentially accrue to consumers from product differentiation, albeit not as 
many as if all potential efficiency-raising entry occurred at the outset.  Likewise, losses in 
welfare were averted by Telecom being able to proceed with the ‘0867’ charges whilst the 
case was being resolved.   
 
By contrast, under a regulated system, regulated services are typically not offered until the 
regulator and all firms concerned have agreed terms, precluding any potential offering of 
services to consumers and consequently delaying the accrual of consumer welfare as well.  
Thus it is not clear that there were necessarily lost opportunities as a consequence of the court 
processes that are not also attendant to the regulatory regime.  Regulation would be superior 
only if it was demonstrably faster at resolving disputes than the court process or resulted in a 
more efficient outcome. Given the extent of welfare gains accrued in the New Zealand case 
relative to other OECD countries, it is difficult to see how ex ante regulation could have 
delivered a clearly better static or dynamic efficiency performance in the internet market than 
exhibited herein.   
 
Concerns were also expressed that the inability of a small entrant to underwrite a lengthy 
court action might induce Telecom to charge higher prices, thereby limiting the gains 
achievable from increased competition.  If the only option available was action brought by 
another firm, then this argument might be plausible.  However, the Commerce Act provisions 
allowed the Commerce Commission as the ultimate custodian of the public interest to bring a 
case if it was deemed necessary due to the degree of fragmentation of the potential claimants 
(as occurred with ‘0867’).  Again, it is difficult to draw conclusions apart from the 
observation that in the ‘0867’ case small firms (ISPs) through lobbying the Commission 
achieved the result of a prosecution without having to incur the full costs themselves.  Such 
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free-riding might actually result in inefficiently too much being spent on lobbying and 
litigation in respect of cases ultimately found not to be exertions of dominance.   
 
2.4.3 Courts, Regulation and Efficiency 
Also to be considered is the observation from Blanchard (1995) and expanded by Carlton & 
Picker (2007) and Howell (2007; 2008) is that in the pursuit of efficiency, court-based 
processes are hampered by the fact that courts are restricted to addressing the matters brought 
before them.  Litigated cases may not be the most important in respect of ensuring the pursuit 
of efficiency.  Furthermore, dependent upon the economic knowledge of the judges or the 
body of jurisprudence used to decide a matter, an action adjudged to be competitive may 
actually result in a reduction in efficiency.  For example, the acceptance of ECPR in the Clear 
case imposes a pricing precedent which is not always the most efficient in all circumstances 
(Economides & White, 1995).  Whilst this statement is true, it is also by no means certain that 
decisions made by regulators are any better in respect to promoting increased efficiency – for 
example, when short-run pursuit of competition is prioritised over long-run pursuit of 
dynamic efficiency (Howell, 2008a).   
 
2.5 Summary 
In conclusion, therefore, the evidence indicates that on balance, the New Zealand 
telecommunications sector under the light-handed regulatory regime combining 
predominantly competition law and contractual constraints performed more efficiently than 
the average OECD country in respect of both static and dynamic efficiency gains, whilst the 
net gains and losses from the transaction costs of the institutional regime are somewhat 
equivocal.    
 
3. Industry-Specific Regulation: 2002-2007 
Following the 1999 general election, in 2000 the incoming coalition government instigated a 
Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications20.  Despite undertaking an analysis of prices and 
uptake of services, and finding New Zealand’s performance not dissimilar to other OECD 
countries, the Inquiry recommended the replacement of the competition law-governed regime 
with an industry-specific regulator with the power to set prices for a range of PSTN-related 
services (termed ‘designated’ services).  The justification given was that cost benefit analyses 
indicated Telecom was still charging prices in excess of cost, thereby necessitating regulatory 
                                                     
20 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/StandardSummary____16318.aspx
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intervention and the imposition of TSLRIC-based prices (i.e. the industry should be regulated 
because it was not performing according to the benchmark of theoretical perfect competition, 
rather than because it was performing demonstrably less well than regimes operating under 
the type of industry-specific regulation proposed).   
 
Importantly, however, the inquiry exempted data services from becoming designated, 
requiring instead that they be wholesaled by Telecom to competitors at regulated ‘retail 
minus’ prices.  Local loop unbundling (LLU) was also rejected on the basis that substantial 
investment in facilities-based competition had already occurred, but with the proviso that a 
further inquiry be undertaken into its feasibility before the end of 2003 (Section 64). These 
recommendations were accepted and given legal force in the Telecommunications Act 2001.  
Importantly, the Act contained a section 19(2) requiring that the Commissioner take account 
of economic efficiency when making his determinations and recommendations, but granted 
the Minister the power to reject recommendations made by the Commissioner in respect of 
additional services to be regulated (Howell, 2008b). 
 
The further recommendation that Telecom alone should bear the cost of the ‘Kiwi Share’ 
social obligations until such time as it could justify to the Minister that its losses necessitated 
adjustments to its capped retail prices was rejected and replaced in the Act with the 
Telecommunications Service Order (TSO).  Under the TSO, the costs to Telecom of 
maintaining unprofitable ‘Kiwi Share’ services would be assessed annually by the regulator 
and shared across all providers in the industry whose trading activities affected Telecom’s 
ability to subsidise the loss-causing customers.  The TSO arrangement finally resolved that 
the entire industry, and not Telecom shareholders alone, bore responsibility for the costs of 
social obligations, via a mechanism that enabled their costs to be transparently separated from 
the prices charged by Telecom to its competitor-customers. 
 
The arrangements finally enacted consisted of many political compromises.  Industry-specific 
regulation replaced competition law as the main institutional governance arrangement.  Initial 
hopes were that the new arrangements would address the principal perceived shortcomings of 
the previous institutions – namely the long time taken to get court decisions and the 
uncertainty this created, and the degree of contention surrounding interconnection agreements 
– whilst retaining the benefits of the ‘light-handed’ approach that had led to the consumer 
gains accrued across the 1990s.  Indeed, the Inquiry report presaged that its recommendations 
“would still see New Zealand at very much the light-handed end of the spectrum, arguably the 
lightest in the OECD” (p 30).  The workload anticipated for the proposed regulatory authority 
was presumed to require an annual budget of $1.5 million and eight to ten staff (p 28).      
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 3.1 Transaction Costs, Institutional Incentives and Dynamic Efficiency 
The Telecommunications Commission was established within the Commerce Commission, 
and the first Commissioner began duties in March 200221.  The decision-making process 
replicated the previous court arrangements, with bilateral agreements between Telecom and 
its rivals to be mediated by the Commission only if the parties could not come to a 
satisfactory agreement themselves.  Draft determinations, followed by conferences and final 
decisions once all views had been sought, replicated the court processes of hearing and 
appeal, but the Commissioner was given wider scope to consider issues not specifically 
brought by industry participants.   
 
3.1.1 Few Incentives to Negotiate 
In practice, however, the structure of the Commission processes and the provisions of the Act 
removed all incentives for market participants to strike contracts outside of the regulatory 
process.  As the costs of the Commission were funded by a market share-based levy on all 
participants, small participants could seek their own determinations rather than relying upon 
the precedents set by the larger firms (as occurred following the 1991-94 Clear case) – in 
effect, free-riding on the larger contributions towards the costs of the processes made by the 
larger participants.  Furthermore, the Act precluded any party striking a product access 
agreement with Telecom outside of the regulatory process from subsequently petitioning the 
regulator for a determination in respect of that product.  Specifically, if another party later 
was granted regulated access to the same product at more favourable terms, the first firm 
could not seek a regulatory intervention to gain access on the same terms as the regulated 
agreement. 
 
The consequence was virtually every agreement between Telecom and its rivals was brought 
before the Commission. This sharply contrasted with only two contested contracts in the 
twelve preceding years, and the extensive use of the Clear-Telecom agreement as a 
benchmark for other contracts.  In 2003, decisions were sought by each of TelstraClear, iHug, 
CallPlus. Compass and WorldXChange for both interconnection and wholesale access to 
Telecom’s other services.  However, given the quasi-court process to be followed, decisions 
were not made rapidly.  The first decision, requested in May 2002, was decided in draft form 
in November of that year and not made final until May 2003, backdated to June 2002.  
Moreover, determinations were initially made for one year periods. Applications for 
                                                     
21 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Print/PrintDocument.aspx?DocumentID=12604
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determinations relating to subsequent years were being lodged within days of final decisions 
being announced for agreements relating to current years.   
 
Simultaneously, the new Commission was also tasked with making the first TSO 
determinations, and by the end of 2003 undertaking a full Inquiry into the efficacy of local 
loop unbundling.  Not surprisingly, the under-resourced Commission rapidly came under 
pressure given the large and substantially unanticipated workload it faced.  Even though 
budgets were expanded (by the 2004/5 financial year, expenditure exceeded $3.7 million22), 
the time taken to reach decisions dragged out.  The first TSO determination, for the 6 month 
period 21 December 2001 to 30 June 2002, begun in March 2002, was delivered on December 
18, 200323.   The second determination, for the period 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003, was not 
finalised until 24 March 2005.   The third TSO determination, for the 2003/4 year, was finally 
announced on March 26, 200724. The 2004/5 and 2005/6 determinations were jointly 
announced on July 9 200725, by which stage a review of the entire TSO arrangement, led by 
the Ministry of Economic Development, was in process26.  In a similar vein, the mobile 
termination inquiry begun in April 2004 was not finally resolved until April 2007 – longer 
than it took for the 1990s ‘Clear’ case to go through three court hearings. 
 
The process shortcomings were in part addressed by amendments in 2006 allowing standard 
terms determinations as a means of reducing the work volume.  That this step was considered 
necessary appears a clear admission that relative to the pre-2001 arrangements, the post-2001 
institutional arrangements substantially increased the transaction costs of system operation, 
irrespective of the quality of the decisions made.   
 
3.1.2 The TSO and Dynamic Efficiency Consequences 
The longer times taken to make decisions reduced dynamic efficiency gains in the market 
relative to the 1987-2001 period.  Whereas previously firms could trade whilst court cases 
were disputed, under the Commission processes, no new services were offered by Telecom’s 
competitors until the respective contracts had been brokered by the Commission.  This 
inevitably led to delays in benefits to consumers from any product differentiation or lower 
prices potentially offered by competitors and new entrants.  
 
                                                     
22 Commerce Commission Annual Report 2004/5 p 24.   
23http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsactcommercecommi.aspx  
24http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsactcommercecommi5.aspx  
25 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsactcommercecommi6.aspx  
26 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=30366  
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An especial concern attends the delays incurred in settling the TSO levies.  The TSO is 
essentially a ‘tax’ on entrants to compensate Telecom for revenues foregone in those areas 
where by dint of the prices Telecom was charging above cost to subsidise rural consumers 
competitive entry was disproportionately concentrated due to the distortion in retail prices.  In 
theory, the tax would overcome the problem of more entry than efficient occurring in highly 
competitive areas by passing on the costs of social services to entrants.  In effect, Telecom 
had already been doing this pre-2001, by using ECPR to set interconnection prices.  However, 
under regulated TSLRIC prices, where the costs could not be included in Telecom’s prices to 
competitors, the compensation had to be recovered via alternative mechanisms.  
 
Whilst the TSO process made the cost to each entrant explicit and transparent, the time taken 
to reach a determination added substantial additional uncertainty to entry and pricing 
decisions.  As the TSO levy was determined in arrears –up to three years after the trading 
activity had occurred - it became impossible to make reasonable entry and pricing decisions 
with any realistic confidence.  Each party had to assess not just the effect of its own strategies 
upon the market, but also those of all its competitors to forecast likely the future tax liability.   
The more participants in the market, the harder the tax forecasting task became. Even small 
errors in assumptions could have significant ramifications upon break-even and entry 
decisions – a significant barrier for small new entrants who lacked reserves to bear the risks 
of possible underestimations, the extent of which would be discovered only when the tax was 
finally levied.  Entry was therefore substantially discouraged, relative to the case where 
Telecom’s ECPR price indicated prior to the entry or pricing decision what the extent of the 
liability would be.  
 
It is also noted that retention of universal service pricing via the TSO perpetuated the 
perversion of investment incentives in rural areas.  Whereas it is likely that alternative 
technologies (e.g. wireless and mobile) offered lower-cost solutions in many rural areas, 
Telecom’s obligation to subsidise rural connections both made it uneconomic for more  
efficient alternative investments to occur whilst simultaneously requiring capital expenditure 
to be outlaid in maintaining and upgrading a likely less efficient network.      
 
3.1.3 Effect of Industry-Specific Regulation on Market Structure 
Hence, it is unsurprising that, unlike the 1990s, no new entry occurred in the fixed line sector 
between 2001 and 2007.  Rather, the dominant structural changes occurring were mergers 
between existing firms with a market presence prior to 2001, notably the horizontal 
integration occurring as network companies bought each other (e.g. TelstraClear formed from 
Telstra, Clear and Saturn) and vertical integration as network operators bought ISPs (e.g. 
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Kordia (fibre, satellite, microwave, wireless and backhaul) buying Orcon, Woosh (wireless) 
buying Quicksilver and Vodafone (mobile) buying iHug).  Each merger reduced both 
competition in the market and the risks posed to decision-making as a consequence of the 
TSO process.  Moreover, the mergers increased both the ability of the small firms to bear the 
TSO forecasting risks and improved the quality of information available upon which to base 
pricing and entry decisions (mobile provider Vodafone was subject to TSO charges as a 
consequence of the competitive effects of mobile upon the fixed line connection and calling 
market).  
 
Furthermore, granting other firms regulated wholesale access to Telecom’s data services had 
substantial effects upon the willingness of firms to continue investing in their own networks, 
even though they had been willing investors in differentiated networks under the pre-2001 
regime.  The TelstraClear CEO welcomed the first wholesale determination in November 
2002 thus: “we believe its more industry efficient for TelstraClear to buy from Telecom rather 
than build duplicate networks to reach consumers who are widely spread throughout New 
Zealand”27.  TelstraClear had previously suspended rollout of its fibre-optic cable network28, 
not long after launching in Christchurch, its third geographic region, in July 200129.   It is 
noted that at the 2000 Inquiry, TelstraClear’s predecessor company Telstra Saturn had 
advocated strongly against LLU because open access to Telecom’s infrastructure would 
undermine the case for ongoing investment in its own fibre-optic network. 
 
3.2 Static Efficiency Performance 
The impression of the intensely vibrant, competitive interaction during the 1990s, with 
substantial welfare gains being accrued by consumers as market participants sought to 
strategically out-manoeuvre each other on the basis of contracts and commercial engagement 
coming to a grinding halt in the 2000s under industry-specific regulation is borne out by the 
New Zealand residential price index in Figure 6, and the Telecommunications Consumer 
Price Index in Figure 7.   
 
3.2.1 Regulated Rates and Price Indices 
Following the extensive gains made in the 1990s (Figure 1), both the fixed line rental and the 
long distance call indices flattened (Figure 6) following regulation, a pattern that remains in 
place through to 2007 in the Services component of the CPI index (in contrast to the 
                                                     
27 http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/companyinfo/media_release_detail.cfm?newsid=81&news_type=tclArchive
28 http://www.wordworx.co.nz/TelecomsReviewBBandCity.htm  
29 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage____4850.aspx#P324_40851  
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continually declining Equipment component – Figure 7).  Whilst the OECD time series 
‘Total’ also shows evidence of flattening over the 2000s (Figure 2), unlike the New Zealand 
index, calling charges continued to decline.  The New Zealand performance must also be 
assessed in conjunction with the 2000 inquiry analysis that there were still presumed to be 
significant ‘rents on the table’ for Telecom that justified setting regulated TSLRIC prices for 
fixed line voice services..   
 
The first regulated interconnection agreement in 2002 fixed a TSLRIC-benchmarked price of 
1.13c per minute, compared to the 2c price in the 1996 agreement (bearing in mind that the 
1996 price included a component to cover the Kiwi Share whereas the 2002 price did not).  
There is no evidence in Figure 5 of any reduction in the interconnection price filtering 
through as benefits to consumers during 2002 and 2003.  Either the rents were not there in the 
first place (i.e. the ECPR prices compensated only for the social costs subsequently returned 
to Telecom via the TSO taxes - net of the costs of collecting them, meaning a net decrease in 
efficiency), or regulated interconnection has resulted simply in a transfer of surplus from 
Telecom to its competitors (a reallocation of rents).  Unlike the 1990s, consumers do not 
appear to have benefited from lower telephone connection and usage prices. Whilst it is 
plausible that the gains have been accrued in increased service and product differentiation, in 
the fixed line voice calling market there is little real differentiation between providers in 
services offered.  Rather, Figures 5 and 6 can be interpreted as symptomatic of a static market 
with few changes occurring, consistent with the introduction of regulatory delays and/or strict 
adherence to historic pricing patterns as providers facing considerable new uncertainties adopt 
a risk-averse stance.  
 
An examination of prices in the broadband market also confirms relatively static patterns of 
interaction.  The Telecommunications index in Figure 6 includes internet connection and 
utilisation prices.  The low prices for ADSL originally introduced by Telecom in 1999 have 
remained largely unchanged in nominal terms albeit with increases in service quality as more 
capable DSLAMs were installed (not captured in the index). Telecom began entering into 
wholesale agreements with competitors in 2003 to provide wholesale services as fast as the 
DSLAM allowed.  By 2006, these were offered to all competitors.  The base 2Mbps service 
has now been upgraded to 8Mbps in most areas, and as high as 20Mbps in some urban 
locations. There has clearly been an increase in consumer welfare from increased uptake of 
the new and faster technologies.  However, given the extent to which New Zealand broadband 
uptake lags international comparators, the apparently lower welfare gains in this market 
despite lower prices requires further analysis.   Aside from the more generally-accepted 
factors depressing New Zealand’s uptake (low GDP per capita, low population density, low 
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urbanisation – de Ridder, 2007; Wallsten, 2006), the institutional regulatory governance 
arrangements and ensuing strategic interactions between market participants, the regulator 
and government also offer some credible explanations.  
 
3.2.2 Bitstream Unbundling, Broadband Uptake and Market Structure 
Bitstream unbundling was mandated in December 2003, but not introduced until September 
2004.  Figure 8 shows that over the first three quarters of 2004, whilst the growth rate of 
ADSL connections was accelerating, the market share Telecom’s competitors fell from over 
35% to less than 24%.  It cannot be discounted that in anticipation of the bitstream products 
becoming available, competitors had few incentives to sell the existing wholesale products 
despite their affiliated ISPs commanding around 50% of the now-mature dial-up internet 
market (Figure 4).  That is, mandating bitstream access regulation resulted in a temporary 
reduction in competition given the time required to introduce a new regulated service.  The 
data are consistent with the ‘regulatory delay’ theory postulated in section 3.1 above. 
 
However, Figure 8 reveals that, even after bitstream services were made available, the market 
share sold by competitors hovered consistently around 25% for over a year in a rapidly 
growing market where the competitors already had a commercial relationship with at least 
half of the most likely purchasers – the dial-up ISP customers.  A likely explanation is that 
given Telecom’s already low prices and the extensive range of two-part tariffs offered, there 
was no margin available in the bitstream product market upon which competitors could 
arbitrage.  Howell (2003) shows that at the time, even New Zealand broadband consumers 
buying connections with high data caps (10Gb/month) typically consumed only low volumes 
of data (average 1.5Gb/month; median 800kb/month).  Consumers could pick the most 
appropriate access and data bundle in order to minimise monthly cash outlay, meaning entry 
level packages with low data caps were the most popular for substituting dial-up users.  When 
the Commission calculated TSLRIC-benchmarked cost-based prices for the bitstream services 
they indicated monthly prices higher than the entry level retail prices charged by Telecom 
since 1999 (Covec, 2004).  The Commissioner reverted to retail-minus pricing for this 
service, but even so, the regulated wholesale price of $27.76 ultimately decided30 compared to 
the entry level Telecom retail price of only $29.95 per month.   
 
                                                     
30 Draft price $28.04 replaced by $27.76 in the final report.   
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/ihugandcallpluswillhavebitstreamac.aspx 
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/commissionapprovesupdatedpriceforw.aspx .  
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3.2.3 Strategic Responses to Regulatory Incentives 
Whilst Telecom’s competitors predictably claimed Telecom’s prices to be evidence of overt 
predatory pricing behaviour designed to foreclose competition, the fact that these prices had 
prevailed for over 5 years without any anti-trust cases being brought and were matched over 
this period by other providers of broadband on other technologies makes this claim difficult to 
substantiate.  However, the competitive response not to vigorously pursue the burgeoning 
broadband market at this time was predictable on two counts.   
 
Firstly, as the margins competitors received from selling dial-up internet access accounts 
exceeded the margins available from bitstream ADSL, it was not in their interests to actively 
promote the substitution of their higher revenue-generating dial-up customers to the less 
profitable bitstream broadband products.  Secondly, the bitstream access arrangement 
regulated in lieu of full LLU in 2003 was conditional upon Telecom selling both an agreed 
number of ADSL connections (250,000) by the end of 2005, with at least one third of them 
being sold by competitors.  Telecom was put on notice that if these targets were not reached, 
the government would impose more stringent regulatory provisions.  For competitors wishing 
to gain access to unbundled copper loops instead of investing in their own networks 
(predominantly the ISPs selling dial-up connections), it was not in their interests for Telecom 
to succeed in meeting the targets.  Strategic gaming of the uptake statistics by refraining from 
actively marketing ADSL would yield both higher margins in the short run, and likely a more 
favourable set of regulated access arrangements in the long run.   
 
Thus, the market dynamics illustrated in Figure 8 are plausibly explained by competitive 
responses to actual and threatened regulatory intervention.   Likewise, New Zealand’s 
sluggish uptake of broadband is plausibly explained by a combination of the Kiwi Share 
making dial-up a very cheap alternative, and the strategic interaction in the sector resulting 
from the cumulative effects of the market dynamics established by the combination of the 
interconnection contracts and Kiwi Share obligations applying in the 1990s overlaid by the 
effects of regulatory intervention in the 2000s.  That New Zealanders did not start purchasing 
broadband in large numbers until 2004 despite very low prices prevailing is most likely 
explained not by exertion of market power or other impediments to competition but by simple 
welfare economics.   
 
3.2.4 Demand-Side Responses Reflected in Usage and Revenue Data 
Until new applications unable to operate successfully on dial-up came into widespread use, 
for low volume users (the majority of New Zealanders) free dial-up access offered better net 
value (welfare) than broadband that had to be paid for (Howell, 2008; 2008b).  The rise in 
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New Zealand’s broadband connections parallels almost exactly the rise in membership of the 
country’s most-visited web property, the consumer-to-consumer trading portal TradeMe 
(transaction volumes on this site rose from nothing in 2004 to an average of over 1000 page 
views per month per active New Zealand internet account in 2008 – the period in which New 
Zealand has exhibited one of the fastest broadband connection growth rates per capita in the 
OECD (Howell, 2008b).  This has also been when worldwide growth in use of peer-to-peer 
sites such as YouTube, Bebo, Facebook and Skype has become significant.  New Zealanders’ 
substitution to broadband has simply occurred later than in other countries where the 
telephony component of dial-up internet access was charged, as the marginal valuation of 
internet use at which substitution will occur is lower the greater the extent to which dial-up 
usage is subsidised from connection charging (Howell, 2008).   
 
The cumulative effect of the growth of broadband connections is reflected in the comparative 
revenue index in Figure 9.  Whilst OECD revenues grew steadily compared to 1997 levels 
over the period 1997 to 2005, New Zealand revenues did not exceed 1997 levels until 2002, at 
which point, consistent with the growth in broadband accounts, revenues began growing.  
Whereas in the average OECD country, consumers paid for use of the internet incrementally 
as their usage grew, in New Zealand it was only once the welfare derived by consumers from 
broadband use overcame the hurdle imposed by the gifting of free use of dial-up internet have 
producer revenues been able to ‘catch up’, with the extent of consumer welfare accrued.  It is 
noted that the area under both the revenue curves in Figure 9 is approximately the same.  The 
difference is that accrual of benefits by producers has been effectively delayed in the New 
Zealand case by the effect of the ‘Kiwi Share’ skewing the initial allocation of the welfare 
benefits of internet use disproportionately towards consumers.   
 
3.3 Further Efficiency Consequences: LLU and Separation 
Despite an absence of evidence via prices or availability of poor efficiency-related broadband 
market performance that could not be plausibly explained as consequences of regulatory 
intervention in the form of either the ‘Kiwi Share’ or the institutional design of regulatory 
arrangements post 2001, in May 2006 the Government imposed mandatory LLU.  In April 
2007 functional separation of Telecom, presaged in the 2006 legislation, was invoked.   
 
The primary justification given for mandating LLU was that New Zealand’s broadband 
uptake per capita was not high enough (i.e. not in the top quartile of the OECD) due to an 
insufficiently competitive market (Network Strategies, 2006).  Even though Telecom 
exceeded the 2003 target of broadband connections sold at the end of 2005 by 11% (i.e. 
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efficiency had increased to the point that targets were exceeded, if connections are a proxy for 
the accrual of consumer welfare), as only 25% were sold by Telecom’s competitors, the 
market was deemed to be insufficiently competitive.  Furthermore as Telecom had slipped 
from investment targets agreed at the 2003 LLU inquiry, it was further proposed that there 
was an investment ‘problem’ that on the basis of interviews with Telecom’s competitors 
would be addressed by competitor investment if LLU and separation proceeded (MED, 2006).    
 
Functional separation was proposed as a means of creating transparency, ‘levelling the 
playing field’ between Telecom and its competitors, further incentivsing investment in the 
New Zealand industry and thereby assisting with the achievement of broadband uptake targets 
(MED, 2006).  
 
3.3.1 Dynamic Efficiency and Investment Incentives 
The literature on the effects of LLU on sector investment suggests that the policy may either 
stimulate investment by new entrants via the ‘Ladder of Investment’ or chill investment 
incentives for the incumbent (Hausman & Sidak, 2005).  The New Zealand evidence above 
suggests that regulatory intervention already undertaken had led to a chilling of investment by 
entrants in their own platforms, even though Telecom appeared to have prioritised its own 
investment towards new services (i.e. ADSL).  In 2003, Telecom announced that it had 
entered into an agreement with Alcatel to develop what would have been at the time the 
OECD’s first nationwide Internet Protocol-based Next Generation Network (NGN).  The 
Commissioner’s decision not to recommend full LLU in 2003 and instead to mandate 
bitstream unbundling was in part predicated upon the risks to continued Telecom investment 
in that project if LLU proceeded, and the risk that given the imminent NGN deployment, the 
assets of unbundling entrants would rapidly become stranded as exchange bypass occurred 
(Commission, 2003; Covec, 2004).  That is, LLU was rejected on longer-term dynamic 
efficiency grounds under Section 19(2) of the Telecommunications Act.  
 
The LLU decision has had a profound effect upon Telecom’s investment incentives.  The 
small size of the New Zealand economy and the large cost of investing in the NGN or any 
other fibre-based network means there are few firms with the resources to engage in such a 
project, from both the extent of capital required or the ability to underwrite the large risks 
inherent.  Telecom is the largest firm (it has comprised of between 20% and 25% of the 
capitalisation of the New Zealand exchange for its entire listing life) in a market for sector 
investment which is very thin.  If Telecom does not invest in new networks, it begs the 
question of who else will.  The investment incentives facing Telecom thus take on a different 
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national economic dimension to those in other countries where capital markets are more 
robust.   
 
3.3.2 Investment and Revenues 
For any investment to proceed, firms must be able to receive a fair return on that investment 
to compensate for both capital use and risk.   The 2006 Stocktake (MED, 2006) found that 
Telecom’s overall investment levels were less than in other comparator countries on a per 
capita basis and on the basis of investment as a percentage of revenue.  Whilst Figure 10 
appears to confirm that New Zealand’s investment as a share of revenue fell substantially 
from 2002, separate analysis of revenues and investment in Figure 9 indicates that in the post-
2002 period, New Zealand’s investment indexed to 1997 levels has exceeded the OECD 
average.   
 
The reason for the fall-off in Figure 10 is because New Zealand’s revenues have increased 
post-2002 as (finally) consumers are paying positive prices for broadband internet access 
whereas historically they were subsidised to use dial-up internet access.  Moreover, New 
Zealand’s investment levels began tracking upward at the same time as revenues began 
increasing.  Quite simply, investments require returns.  The slippage in Telecom’s NGN 
investment plans could plausibly be explained by the fact that the firm underestimated the 
effect of dial-up internet subsidies on the delay and suppression of broadband substitution 
rates and therefore its ability to invest as extensively in the NGN and as early as it had 
originally planned.  When revenues began accruing, investment accelerated.  Further, it 
cannot be discounted that additional regulatory obligations (e.g. bitstream unbundling 
provision) diverted investment and workforce attention otherwise intended for the NGN.  
 
Figure 10 also confirms that, unlike the rest of the OECD, where investment increased 
dramatically in the dot-com boom and then plummeted in the 2001 crash and had only just 
returned to 1997 levels by 2005, the New Zealand industry patterns remained constant.  
Consequently, the inefficient over-investment and extensive stranding of assets occurring in 
many other OECD markets following the crash were not significant features of the New 
Zealand market. 
 
3.3.3 Investment Compromises, Higher Costs and Stranded Assets 
However, following the LLU and separation decisions, Telecom’s NGN investment 
incentives have altered markedly.  The costs of the new regulations were quickly factored into 
the market price for Telecom shares, which are currently trading at $3.28, their lowest price in 
7/20/2008 -32- 32
15 years31.  The shares dropped 25% in value when LLU was announced in May 200632.  
They have dropped a further 20% in value in the two years subsequently, as the full 
ramifications of the regulatory regime upon Telecom have become apparent.  It is far from 
clear (and most unlikely) that this reduction in Telecom shareholder value has been captured 
as share value increases recorded in other firms in the market (many are not listed).  
 
In response to the LLU and separation policies, in April 2007 Telecom management 
announced that of the $1500 million needed to build the network envisaged in the 
government’s policy, under the current arrangements, it could justify only $500 million.  The 
threat to withhold investment was made credible in May 2007, when the company returned 
$1,100 million of the proceeds of the sale of its directory business to shareholders33.   
 
Following extensive negotiations, however, the firm announced on October 26 that it would 
proceed with an investment of $1,400 million over the next five years, with a view to all 
towns with more than 500 lines being able to receive next-generation IP-based network 
services and ADSL services of 20Mbps by 201234.  Whilst this announcement appears to 
reinstate the 2003 NGN plan objectives, as a result of the falling share price and the 
unequivocally higher cost of capital this imposes, the network will cost substantially more 
than under the pre-LLU and separation counterfactual.  These increases will inevitably be 
passed through to consumers, especially if as a consequence of regulatory changes, 
investment in competing networks is further chilled and Telecom’s dominance in the 
provision of broadband services is increased due to even greater reliance upon its networks to 
provide last-mile connections to consumers.    
 
Perversely, Telecom’s NGN investment decision leading to increased dynamic efficiency 
from better services renders the decisions by competitors to proceed with investments in 
Telecom’s exchanges under LLU vulnerable to losses, and the market to increased static 
inefficiencies, as a consequence of asset stranding (as presaged by the Commissioner in 
2003). Thus, it is not surprising to find Telecom’s competitors accusing the firm of being anti-
competitive, and seeking regulatory intervention to protect them from the consequences of 
Telecom’s decisions to close exchanges already subject to unbundling as it replaces them with 
kerbside NGN cabinets.  Not surprisingly, Telecom has prioritised its investments around the 
same high volume, low cost exchanges which have attracted the most competitor interest – 
                                                     
31 http://www.nzx.com/news/markets/4607445  
32 Wilkinson (2006) estimates the LLU decision resulted in  the write-off of $3 and $4 billion of shareholder value – close to the 
price paid for the firm on privatization in 1990.  
33 http://www.telecom.co.nz/binarys/q3_07_presentation.pdf,  p 3 
34 http://www.telecom-media.co.nz/releases_detail.asp?id=3497&page=1&pagesize=10
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not because of the motive of foreclosing competition but because these are the ones where it 
is economically most rational to invest as the potential returns are higher.  Interestingly, the 
most prolific investor in Telecom’s unbundled exchanges (and the owner of the largest stock 
of likely stranded assets) is the government-owned Kordia-Orcon.   
 
3.3.4 The Scale of New Zealand and the Impact of Regulatory Overheads 
In addition to the dynamic incentive effects, further transaction costs have been imposed on 
the industry as a consequence of proceeding with LLU and separation.  Both are very costly 
processes, and must be considered in proportion to the small scale of the New Zealand market 
and the likely extent of any additional benefits, given prices are already low and ADSL 
speeds high by OECD standards.  Functional separation was estimated by Telecom to impose 
a fixed cost of NZ$300 million on the firm – not dissimilar to the £70 million estimated fixed 
cost to BT of creating Openreach (converted using purchasing power parity exchange rates).  
The effect of scale suggests that the per capita or per account costs of separation will be very 
much larger in New Zealand than in Britain, indicating a much higher benefit threshold must 
be passed to justify the adoption of separation in New Zealand.  On the basis of household 
size, the costs per household of the fixed costs alone are 16 to 17 times higher in New 
Zealand than in Britain.  Had a comparative cost-benefit analysis been undertaken, the 
benefits of separation would have needed to be 16 to 17 times greater per household than 
those in Britain to justify proceeding. 
 
Benchmarking the costs of separation against the costs of a broadband account suggests that it 
is highly unlikely that the fixed costs of separation are likely to be recouped in further 
benefits. Even using generous estimates based upon New Zealand meeting its Digital Strategy 
target of entering the top quartile of the OECD in broadband connections per capita (i.e. 
approximately the 25 connections per 100 or 1 million broadband accounts) indicates a fixed 
cost of separation of $300 per broadband account.  This burden equates to the cost of 10 
months broadband access based upon the entry level product.  The ongoing costs equate to a 
further 10% of the monthly costs equated on a per-account basis.  Apportioned across the 
650,000 accounts already purchased at the time separation was announced (a less generous 
allocation), the policy imposed a per-account burden equivalent to between 16 and 17 months 
connection.   
 
It is difficult to see where benefits of the extent indicated will be generated as a consequence 
of the regulatory instrument chosen being implemented.  Inevitably, Telecom’s prices must 




In sum, therefore, it would appear that the industry-specific regulatory regime from 2002 to 
2007 has failed to generate efficiency gains comparable to the regime that preceded it.  As a 
consequence of the incentives created and substantial underestimation of their effects, the 
institutional arrangements imposed are more bureaucratic and cumbersome, and hence more 
costly in both out-of-pocket expenses and potential dynamic efficiency losses than the 
arrangements that proceeded them.  Neither is it clear that they have succeeded in making the 
market more competitive.  Indeed, the reverse appears to have occurred, with strategic 
gaming of political and regulatory processes appearing to replace strategic competitive 
commercial interaction in shaping the direction of the industry.  Whilst investment is 
occurring, it is more costly than previously was the case as a consequence of the additional 
overheads incurred.   
 
4. Lessons from New Zealand   
Returning to the questions posed in Section 1, on balance over the efficiency metrics chosen 
for analysis, it can be concluded that the competition law-based regime prevailing in New 
Zealand between 1987 and 2001 outperformed the comparator ‘OECD average’, where 
industry-specific regulation of the form New Zealand subsequently adopted prevailed.  In all 
of the dimensions of static and dynamic efficiency and institutional transaction costs 
examined, the 2002-7 regime performance was incrementally worse than the 1987-2001 
regime.  Consequently, it can be concluded that, in the New Zealand case, the industry-
specific regulatory regime has failed to improve on overall sector efficiency performance 
relative to the regime it replaced.  The failure has led to further changes increasing the degree 
of regulatory restraint, which are unlikely to result in further improvements.   
 
However, it is too simplistic to take the analysis as ‘proof’ that competition law offers a 
superior governance method.  The New Zealand example illustrates that the contracts and 
agreements that shape the interaction between participants, whether they be commercially-
negotiated or imposed by governments or regulatory institutional design, are the fundamental 
determinants of sector performance.  Issues of institutional design have been significant at the 
margin, especially in respect of the costs imposed by New Zealand’s Commerce Commission 
processes pre-2006, which are not necessarily features of regulatory process design in other 
countries (e.g. Finland – Howell & Sangekar, 2008).  Their effects cannot be ignored.  
However, the consequences of the ‘Kiwi Share’ have been the most influential factors in 
determining relative and absolute performance of the sector.   
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‘Kiwi Share’ consequences shaped interaction in the 1990s, spurred the Clear case, created 
the burgeoning growth of internet use and the consequent strategic arbitrage that seeded both 
dynamic efficiency improvements and the subsequent ‘0867’ case.  Historic decisions made 
in the 1990s therefore affected the types of strategic interaction occurring in the 2000s.  Low 
ADSL prices meant the New Zealand market responded differently to opening up access to 
bitstream unbundling than in other countries.  Subsidised dial-up internet access distorted 
consumer responses to broadband products. New Zealand’s market responded differently 
from other OECD markets.   
 
Unfortunately, it was all too easy for the New Zealand politicians, public, regulators and 
market participants pre-2001 to jump to the flawed conclusion that it was the differences in 
overarching industry governance arrangements and institutions that were ‘causing’ the 
observable differences.  The flaws in reasoning that led to increasingly more stringent 
industry-specific regulation were driven in part by over-reliance upon structural and 
institutional measures of competitiveness in assessing sector performance – e.g. market shares 
and the number of entrants – and insufficient attention being given to efficiency-related 
measures such as prices and revenues.  The focus on institutions and market structure rather 
than contracts and efficiency further obscured the need to revisit the one part of the regulatory 
arrangements that was not assigned to the purview of either the courts or the regulator – the 
‘Kiwi Share’.   
 
The lessons to be taken from the analysis of the New Zealand industry are that in the final 
analysis, it is the nature of the contracts and participants’ responses to them that matter most 
for sector performance.  Optimal institutional arrangements will differ depending upon 
underlying economic circumstances and the nature of contractual interaction that ensues. 
Competition law and industry-specific regulation are complements which can in conjunction 
lead to increased efficiency, as shown under the joint governance of competition law and the 
‘Kiwi Share’ in the 1990s.  They do not have to be seen only as substitutes (Crandall & 
Picker, 2007).  The removal of the purview of a regulator from the day-to-day governance of 
the sector does not mean the end of regulatory control, if contractual undertakings and 
legislated obligations can impose comparable disciplines that further the pursuit of economic 
efficiency.  In the final analysis, the balance must be determined by trading off the different 
forms of efficiency consequences of each set of circumstances as they are faced.  There is no 
‘one size’ of regulation, institution, competition or market structure that ‘fits all’.  Each case 
must be measured and assessed on its efficiency-based merits and underlying economic 
circumstances.  Pursuit of efficiency, not pursuit of competition, must be the goal.    
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 Figure 1.  NZ REAL RESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE PRICE INDEX 1991-2001 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Figure 3.  New Zealand Telephony Network Traffic 1996-2003 
Source: Howell & Obren (2003:33) 
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Dial-up Connections DSL Connections Dial-up Hrs/Month
Source data: Statistics New Zealand ISP Surveys and Telecom Management Commentaries 
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Broadband Connections Market Share of Telecom Competitors  
Source data: Telecom Management Commentaries 
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